Video 2000 was developed jointly by
Philips and Grundig as a replacement for their ageing VCR, VCR-LP and
SVR format machines and as a direct competitor to VHS and BETA. It
boasted a flip-over cassette fractionally bigger than a VHS cassette,
which could record up to 4 hours on each side. It also used a system of
"Automatic" tracking with it's Dynamic Track Following (DTF) system.
This meant that the tracking was always 100% perfect even on still pause
and picture search modes. It achieved this by having the video heads
mounted on piezo electric actuators which followed the tracks as they
were scanned.
During
the course of the 1970's, Philips, in Holland, and their German
associates Grundig continued to develop the VCR format, increasing both
the record/playback time and the quality of the images, and adding more
and more features to their already sophisticated machines. This
development spawned VCR-LP and SVR, but by the end of the seventies
Philips were promising the imminent arrival of a remarkable new format.
This was called VCC, for Video Compact Cassette, but is more usually
known as Video 2000.
(Philips also invented the
standard music cassette format, which they called ACC -- Audio Compact
Cassette. This name didn't catch on either!)
Despite missing
several launch dates, when V2000 finally arrived in 1980 it was indeed
as revolutionary as they had promised. Alone of all video cassette
formats, VCC tapes could be turned over, just like audio tapes. This
meant that a cassette almost exactly the same size as a VHS tape could
hold six or even eight hours, in total. A later version with long play
increased this to a staggering 16 hours!
V2000
machines were also extremely sophisticated, using microprocessor control
for all manner of trick-play and programming features. Perhaps the most
advanced feature of all was Dynamic Track Following, or DTF; this was
an automatic tracking system which moved the heads as they scanned each
track:
The head chips were mounted on the drum on tiny chips of
piezo-electric crystal. This crystal changes shape when an electric
current is passed through it, so by applying the appropriate signal, the
heads could be kept in the perfect position at all times. Consequently,
V2000 decks needed no Tracking control, and could produce a perfect,
noise-free picture at all speeds, in both directions (even playing in
reverse), and on recordings made on other machines which were out of
alignment.
General Construction
On the plus side these VCR's were construted in a modular fashion with
each printed circuit board carrying out a distinct function.
On the down side, these many PCB are connected together using plugs,
sockets and wire links which are prone to failure. The electronics
inside the VCR's is by todays standard fairly straight forward with
many discrete componenets being used together to perform the complex
functions required. This means getting hold of components to repair
electrical problems is by and large still possible. However this good
news is more than wiped out by the fact that it is now near impossible
to get hold of mechanical parts such as pressure rollers, capstan motors
and video heads. For the most part it is a case of having to break up
several machines to get one working.
Video heads for V2000 machines are now rare and extremely difficult to
obtain.
Specifications
|
System
Video recording system
V2000, Rotary two-head helical scanning
Video Signal
CCIR standards, PAL colour
Aerial input
75-ohm, asymmetrical aerial socket
Channel coverage
UHF: Western European
channels band IV/V
471.25-855.25 Mhz
(Up to 99 programmes can be preset.)
RF output signal
UHF channels E30 to E43 (variable)
75 ohms, unbalanced
Video
Horizontal resolution
Luminance 3MHz ( -20db)
Chroma 600khz (-26db)
B/W:312 lines
Video S/N
Better than 44dB CCIR
421-2 annex III
Drop-Out compensation
> 16db, 5 lines max
Audio frequency response
50Hz to 10,000Hz ( 8db )
Audio S/N
Approx 50dB DIN 45500
Inputs and outputs
Video input
VIDEO IN: Via A-V adaptor
1.0 V (p-p)
75 ohms, unbalanced,
sync negative
Video output
VIDEO OUT: Via A-V adaptor
1.0 V (p-p)
75Ohms, unbalanced,
sync negative
Audio inputs
AUDIO IN: Via A-V adaptor
|
- Audio outputs
- AUDIO OUT: Via A-V adaptor
- Tuner input sensitivity
- < 120 µ V Band IV > V
Tape transport
- Tape speed 24.40 mm/sec.
- Maximum recording time
- 2 x 4 hours 0 min. (with VCC-480 cassette)
- Fast forward/rewind time
- 180 sec. (with VCC-480)
Timer
- Clock
- LED
- Time indication
- 24-hour cycle
- Timer setting Only for recording
- Power backup
- incorporating self charging circuit
General
- Power requirements
- 240v AC, 50-60 Hz
- Power consumption
- 75W ( 15W standby )
- Dimensions
- Approx. 540 x 365 x 365 mm (w/h/d)
- including projecting parts and controls
- Weight
- Approx. 17.5 kg net
|
Video 2000 was developed jointly by
Philips and Grundig as a replacement for their ageing VCR, VCR-LP and
SVR format machines and as a direct competitor to VHS and BETA. It
boasted a flip-over cassette fractionally bigger than a VHS cassette,
which could record up to 4 hours on each side. It also used a system of
"Automatic" tracking with it's Dynamic Track Following (DTF) system.
This meant that the tracking was always 100% perfect even on still pause
and picture search modes. It achieved this by having the video heads
mounted on piezo electric actuators which followed the tracks as they
were scanned.
The first Video 2000 format machine from
Philips was the VR2020 of 1980. This was a pretty basic machine even by
1980 standards, but it sold in reasonable numbers. The first Grundig
V2000 machine was the model 700 "2x4", which was launched at pretty much
the same time*. The Grundig machine was slightly smaller and lighter
than the Philips, but had a virtually identical basic set of features.
Superficially the first generation
Philips Video 2000 machines resembled their earlier relatives, the VCR
and VCR-LP machines (N1500, N1700 etc.) They were roughly the same size
and weight as their older relatives and had the same "slopey front"
styling, however, inside they were far more advanced.
The new machines
were operated with all-electronic soft-touch buttons, and a
microprocessor was used to control the tape transport, the clock, the
counter and the timer. All the machines featured a "Goto" button whereby
a specific tape-counter number could dialled in and the machine would
speed off and find it. There was a problem with this because the tape
had to have been initially rewound to the beginning if the counter was
to be relied on to find a specific program. If the counter had gone
backwards beyond zero or had gone past 9999, then the machine would wind
the tape the wrong way to get to the specific number.
Although none of
the VR2020, VR2021 or VR2022 had a remote control facility as standard,
they could all be converted to remote control with a box that plugged
into the back of the machine and a little infra-red receiver which
clipped into the front.
Of the Philips VR2020 there were several
badge engineered versions from manufacturers such as ITT, Pye etc. Bang
and Olufsen made a version of the VR2020 called the 8800, but this
looked significantly different from the Philips original. It had a
remote control receiver built in as standard, but, strangely, it also
had a modified audio response to suit B&O's then current range of
televisions.etc.
Soon after the VR2020 came the Philips
VR2021 and VR2022. Although the VR2021 had an identical feature set to
the VR2020, it had more in common electronically with the VR2022 which
had extra "Trick-play" facilities such as noise-free picture search and
still pause.
These two newer machines also used much nicer looking
chrome on the front panel instead of aluminium which tended to corrode
easily.
There was briefly a stereo version of the VR2022 called the
VR2022S but this was only available in certain European countries and
not in the UK.
Next came the VR2023 and VR2024. These
machines resembled the 3 Philips Video 2000 machines before them,
although some of the timer controls were now covered by a little flap
and the search and still pause (and an extra slow-motion button) were on
separate buttons below the standard controls.
These two new machines
also featured a remote control interface as standard. The difference
between the VR2023 and the VR2024 was that the latter model was a linear
stereo version of the VR2023, making it the first
(universally-available) stereo Video 2000 machine. Philips soon
discovered a problem with the front panels of these two machines: the
microprocessor that controlled the buttons would sometimes lock-up if
two buttons were pressed in quick succession which meant that if the
problem occurred, the machine had to be unplugged from the mains for a
few seconds before any further commands could be given.
The next Philips Video 2000 machine to
appear was the VR2025 and this was to be Philips' first front loading
Video 2000 machine. However, it was merely a Grundig "2x4 Stereo" with a
slightly different colour scheme and a Philips badge. No real attempt
was made to disguise this machine; it even had the classic Grundig
unfathomable timer, and peculiar tape transport legends such as "Tape"
which meant "Stop" and "Cassette" which meant "Eject".
Later came a second generation of Philips
Video 2000 machines including a battery operated portable model. These
were all much smaller than their first generation relatives and
culminated in Philips' top models, the VR2350 "Matchline" and the VR2840
which featured linear stereo audio and a long-play mode (XL or
eXtra-Long) to provide a staggering 16 hours from a single tape, before
the format was discontinued in 1985.
As a point of interest, Grundig made a
very cheap Video 2000 machine (model 1600) which didn't have Dynamic
Track Following at all, instead it used an "automatic tracking" system
like many VHS machines of the day. This was okay to replay tapes
recorded on itself but was famously awful when it came to replaying
tapes recorded on another machine.
PAL and NTSC VHS video tapes Tape speed:
PAL
SP: 23,39 mm/sec
LP: 11,7 mm/sec
NTSC
SP: 33.35 mm/sec (1 3/8 inches/s)
LP: 16.67 mm/sec (11/16 inches/s)
EP: 11.11 mm/sec (7/16 inches/s)
Tape formats
| PAL/SECAM times | NTSC times
name length/metres | SP LP | SP LP EP
============================================================================
E-30 45 m 30 min 60 min 22 min 44 min 66 min
E-60 88 m 60 min 120 min 44 min 88 min 132 min
E-90 130 m 90 min 180 min 65 min 130 min 195 min
E-120 173 m 120 min 240 min 86 min 172 min 258 min
E-180 258 m 180 min 360 min 129 min 258 min 387 min
E-240 346 m 240 min 480 min 173 min 346 min 519 min
E-300 432 m 300 min 600 min 216 min 432 min 648 min
T-20 44 m 28 min 56 min 20 min 40 min 60 min
T-30 64 m 42 min 84 min 30 min 60 min 90 min
T-45 94 m 63 min 126 min 45 min 90 min 135 min
T-60 125 m 84 min 168 min 60 min 120 min 180 min
T-90 185 m 126 min 252 min 90 min 180 min 270 min
T-120 246 m 169 min 338 min 120 min 240 min 360 min
T-160 326 m 225 min 450 min 160 min 320 min 480 min
T-200 407 m 281 min 562 min 200 min 400 min 600 min
Grundig AG
is (WAS) a German manufacturer of consumer electronics for
home entertainment which transferred to Turkish control in the
period 2004-2007. Established in 1945 in Nuremberg, Germany
by Max Grundig the company changed hands several times before
becoming part of the Turkish Koç Holding group. In 2007, after
buying control of the Grundig brand, Koc renamed its
Beko Elektronik white goods
and consumer electronics division Grundig Elektronik A.Ş., which has
decided to merge with Arçelik A.Ş. as declared on February 27, 2009
Max Grundig (7
May 1908 – 8 December 1989) was the founder of electronics company
Grundig AG.Max Grundig is one of the leading business personalities of
West German post-war society, one of the men responsible for the German
“Wirtschaftswunder” (post-war economic boom).
GRUNDIG Early years
Max
Grundig was born in Nuremberg on May 7, 1908. His father died early, so
Max and his three sisters grew up in a home without a father. At 16,
Max Grundig began to be fascinated by radio technology, which at the
time was gaining in popularity. He built his first detector in the
family’s apartment, which he had turned into his own laboratory. In
1930, he turned his hobby into his profession and opened a shop for
radio sets in Fürth with an associate. The business prospered and soon
Grundig was able to employ his sisters and buy out his associate. By
1938, he was already manufacturing 30,000 small transformers.
GRUNDIG Success after World War II
Max
Grundig’s real success story began after World War II. On May 15, 1945,
Grundig opened a production facility for universal transformers at
Jakobinerstraße 24 in Fürth. Using machines and supplies from the war
era, he established the basis for what would turn into a global company
at this address. In addition to transformers, Grundig soon manufactured
tube-testing devices. As manufacturing radios was subject to a licence,
Grundig had the brilliant idea of developing a kit that would allow
anyone to quickly build a radio on their own. This kit was sold as a
“toy” called “Heinzelmann”.
Following
the monetary reform, Max Grundig quickly expanded his production under
the new company name “Grundig Radio-Werke GmbH” and served the expanding
mass market. From 1952, his company was the biggest European
manufacturer of radios and the worldwide leader in the production of
audio tape recorders.
Grundig
became a real pioneer in consumer electronics. From 1951, the company’s
portfolio also included the production and distribution of television
sets, and dictaphones were added in 1954. The company was turned into a
shareholding company, the Grundig AG, in 1971. In the 1970s, the company
was one of the leading companies in Germany, employing more than 38,000
people in 1979. Max Grundig had built a strong company from the ruins
of the war.
GRUNDIG and the rules are changing
In
the second half of the 1970s, another innovation entered the market for
consumer electronics, the VCR. And with the VCR, competitors from Japan
and later other countries of the Far East entered the world market.
Even though the European competitors Philips and Grundig had developed
the superior technology for recording video, the Japanese VHS succeeded
on the market. The rules of the game changed dramatically in the field
of consumer electronics. The competition for establishing the video
standard proved that companies could only succeed in consumer
electronics with the financial power of global corporations. In 1979,
Max Grundig decided to sell some shares to his Dutch competitor Philips,
and in 1984 he began the process of restructuring the ownership of the
Grundig companies, which would be completed two decades later.
Max
Grundig died on December 8, 1989 in Baden-Baden. The Grundig name
continues to be known to this day and is now a globally recognised brand
for innovative consumer electronics. Max Grundig is remembered in
Germany as a dynamic entrepreneur from the post-war era.
He was married lastly to Chantal Grundig.
Early history
The
history of the company began in 1930 with the establishment
of a store named Fuerth, Grundig & Wurzer (RVF), which
sold radios. After World War II Max Grundig recognized the
need for radios in Germany, and in 1947 produced a kit, while a
factory and administration centre were under construction at
Fürth. In 1951 the first televisions were manufactured at the
new facility with the company and the surrounding area growing
rapidly. At the time Grundig was the largest radio
manufacturer in Europe. Divisions in Nuremberg, Frankfurt and
Karlsruhe were set up.
Grundig in Belfast
A
plant was opened in 1960 to manufacture tape recorders in
Belfast, Northern Ireland, the first production by Grundig
outside Germany. The managing director of the plant Thomas
Niedermayer, was kidnapped and later killed by the Provisional
IRA in December 1973. The factory was closed with the loss of around 1000 jobs in 1980.
Philips takeover
In
1972, Grundig GmbH became Grundig AG. After this Philips
began to gradually accumulate shares in the company over the
course of many years, and assumed complete control in 1993.
Philips resold Grundig to a Bavarian consortium in 1998 due to
unsatisfactory performance.
Later history
At
the end of June 2000 the company relocated its headquarters
in Fürth and Nuremberg. Grundig lost €1.281 million the
following year. In autumn 2002, Grundig's banks did not extend
the company's lines of credit, leaving the company with an
April 2003 deadline to announce insolvency. Grundig AG
declared bankruptcy in 2003, selling its satellite equipment
division to Thomson. In 2004 Britain's Alba plc and the Turkish Koc's Beko
jointly took over Grundig Home InterMedia System, Grundig's
consumer electronics division. In 2007 Alba sold its half of
the business to Beko for US$50.3 million, although it retained the licence to use the Grundig brand in the UK until 2010, and in Australasia until 2012.
...........................................The Federal Republic of Germany: Holding the Ring?
For more than thirty years after t
he Second World War, consumer
electronics in West Germany, as elsewhere, was a growth industry.
Output growth in the industry was sustained by buoyant consumer
demand for successive generations of new or modified products,
such as radios (which had already begun to be manufactured, of
course, before the Second World War), black-and-white and then
colour television sets, hi-fi equipment.” Among the largest West
European states, West Germany had by far the strongest industry.
Even as recently as 1982, West Germany accounted for 60 per cent
of the consumer electronics production in the four biggest EEC
states. The West German industry developed a strong export
orientation--in the early 1980s as much as 60 per cent of West
German production was exported, and West Germany held a larger
share of the world marltet than any other national industry apart
from the]apanese.ltwas also technologicallyextremelyinnovative-
the first tape recorders, the PAL colour television technology, and
the technology which later permitted the development of the video
cassette recorder all originated in West Germany.
The standard-bearers of the West German consumer electronics
industry were the owner-managed firm, Grundig, and Telefunken,
which belonged to the electrical engineering conglomerate, AEG-
Telefunlten. The technological innovations for which the West
German industry became famous all stemmed from the laboratories
of Telefunlten, which, in the 19605, still constituted one of AEG’s
most profitable divisions. Telefunlcen and Grundig together prob-
ably accounted for around one-third of employment in the German
Industry in the mid-1970s. Both had extensive foreign production
facilities. At the same time, compared with the other EEC states,
there was still a relatively large number of small and medium-sized
consumer electronics firms in Germany. Besides Grundig and
Telefunken, the biggest were Blaupunkt, a subsidiary of Bosch, the
automobile components manufacturer, Siemens, and the sub-
sidiaries of the ITT-owned firm, SEL. Up until the late 1970s, there
was relatively little foreign-owned manufacturing capacity in the
West German consumer electronics industry.
GOVERNMENTS, MARKETS, AND REGULATION
During the 1970s, this picture of a strong West German
consumer electronics industry began slowly to change and, by the end of the 19705, colour television manufacture no longer offered a guarantee for the continued prosperity or even survival of the German industry. The market for colour television sets was increasingly saturated——by 1978 56 per cent of all households in
West Germany had a colour television set and 93 per cent of all households possessed a television set of some kind.2° From 1978 onwards, the West German market for colour television sets began
to contract. Moreover, the PAL patents began to expire around
1980 and the West German firms then became exposed to more
intense competition on the (declining) domestic market.
The West German firms’ best chances for maintaining or
expanding output and profitability lay in their transition to the
manufacture of a new generation of consumer electronics products,
that of the video cassette recorder (VCR). Between 1978 and 1983,
the West German market for VCRs expanded more than tenfold, so
that, by the latter year, VCRs accounted for over a fifth of the
overall consumer electronics market.“ However, in this product
segment, Grundig was the only West German firm which, in
conjunction with Philips, managed to establish a foothold, while
the other firms opted to assemble and/or sell VCRs manufactured
according to one or the other of the two Japanese video
technologies. By 1981, the West German VCR market was more
tightly in the grip of Japanese firms than any other segment of the
market. More than any other, this development accounted for the
growing crisis of the West German consumer electronics industry in
the early 1980s. The West German market stagnated, production
declined as foreign firms conquered a growing share of the
domestic market and this trend was not offset by an expansion of
exports, production processes were rationalized to try to cut costs
as prices fell, employment contracted,” and more and more plants
were either shut down or—more frequently——taken over.
The
relationship between the state and the consumer electronics industry in
the long post-war economic ‘boom’ was of the ‘arm’s length’ kind which
corresponded to the West German philosophy
of the ‘social market
economy’. The state's role was confined largely to ‘holding the ring’
for the firms and trying to ensure by means of competition policy that
mergers and take-overs did not enable any single firm or group of firms
to achieve a position of market domination and suspend the ‘free play of
market forces’.
The implementation of competition policy was the
responsibility of the Federal Cartel Office (FCO), which must be
informed of any planned mergers or take-overs if the two firms each have
a turnover
exceeding 1 DM billion or one of them has a turnover of more than
2 DM billion. The FCC must reject any proposed merger which, in
its view, would lead to the emergence of a, or strengthen any
existing, position of market domination.“
Decisions of the FCO may be contested in the Courts, and firms
whose merger or take-over plans have been rejected by the Cartel
Office may appeal for permission to proceed with their plans to the
Federal Economics Minister. He is empowered by law to grant such
permission when it is justified by an ‘overriding public interest’ or
‘macroeconomic benefits’, which may relate to competitiveness on
export markets, employment, and defence or energy policy.”
However, the state had no positive strategy for the consumer
electronics industry and industry, for its part, appeared to have no
demands on the state, other than that, through its macroeconomic
policies, it should provide a favourable business environment. This
situation changed only when, as from the late 1970s onwards, the
Japanese export offensive in consumer electronics plunged the West
German industry into an even deeper crisis.
The Politics of European Restructuring
The burgeoning crisis of not only the West German, but also the
other national consumer electronics industries in the EC in the
early 1980s prompted pleas from the firms (and also organized
labour) for protective intervention by the state——by the European
Community as well as by its respective national Member States.
The partial ‘Europeanization’ of consumer electronics politics
reflected the strategies chosen and pursued by the major European
firms to try to counter, or avoid, the Japanese challenge. These
strategies contained two major elements: measures of at least
temporary protection against Japanese imports to give the firms
breathing space to build up or modernize their production
capacities and improve their competitiveness uis-ci-uis the Japanese
and partly also to put pressure on the Japanese to establish
production facilities in Europe and produce under the same
conditions as the European firms and (b), through mergers, take-
overs, and co-operation agreements, to regroup forces with the aim
of achieving similar economies of scale to those enjoyed by the most
powerful Japanese firms. The first element of these strategies
implicated the European Community in so far as it is responsible
for the trade policies of its Member States. The second element did
not necessarily involve the European Community, but had a Euro-
pean dimension to the extent that most of the take-overs and mergers
envisaged in the restructuring of the industry involved firms from
two or more of the EEC Member States, including the French state-
owned Thomson (see above). As this ‘regrouping of the forces’ of
the European consumer electronics industry was to unfold at first
largely on the West German market, the firms could only
implement their strategies once they had obtained the all-clear of
the FCO or, failing that, of the Federal Economics Ministry.
The Politics of Video Recorder Trade between japan and the EEC:
The Dutch-based multinational conglomerate, Philips, was the first
firm in the world to bring a VCR on to the market. Between 1972
and 1975, it had no competitors at all in VCR manufacture and, as
late as 1977, it split up the European market with Grundig, with
which Philips developed the V2000 VCR which came on to the
market in 1980. By this time, the Japanese consumer electronics
firms had already built up massive VCR production capacities and
had cornered first their own market and then, unchallenged by the
European firms, the American as well. With the advantage of much
greater economies of scale, they were able to manufacture and offer
VCRs more cheaply than Philips and Grundig when the VCR
market did eventually ‘take off‘ in Western Europe. German
imports of VCRs, for example, increased almost eightfold between
1978 and 1981.2
The immediate background to the calls for protection against
imported Japanese VCRs by European VCR manufacturing firms
was formed by massive cuts in prices for Japanese VCRs, as a
consequence of which, in 1982, the market share held by the V2000
VCR manufactured by Philips and Grundig declined sharply.”
Losses incurred in VCR manufacture led to a dramatic worsening
of Grundig’s financial position. In November 1982 Philips and
Grundig announced that they were considering taking a dumping
case against the Japanese to the European Commission. The case,
which was later withdrawn, can be seen as the first move in a
political campaign designed to secure controls or restraints on
Japanese VCR exports to the EEC states. This campaign was
pursued at the national and European levels, both through the
national and European trade associations for consumer electronics
firms and particularly through direct intervention by the firms at
the national governments and the European Commission. However,
the European firms, many of whom had licensing agreements with
the Japanese, were far from being united behind it.
Philips, seconded by its VCR partner, Grundig, was the ‘real
protagonist’ of protectionist measures against Japanese VCRs. In
pressing their case on EEC member states and the European
Commission, they emphasized the unfair trading practices of the
Japanese in building up production capacities which could meet the
entire world demand for VCRs (‘laser-beaming’), and the threats
which the Japanese export offensive posed to jobs in Western
Europe and to the maintenance of the firms’ R. 8: D. capacity and
technological know-how. Above all, however, was the threat which
the crisis in VCR trade and the consumer electronics industry
generally posed to the survival of a European microelectronic
components industry, over half of whose output, according to
Grundig, was absorbed in consumer electronics products.”
These arguments found by all acco
unts a very receptive audience at the European Commission, where, by common consent of German participants in the policy-formation process, Philips wields great political influence. By all accounts, Philips‘s pressure was also responsible for the conversion to the protectionist camp of the Dutch Government, which hitherto had been a bastion of free trade philosophy within the EEC. By imposing unilateral import controls through the channelling of imported VCRs through the customs depot at Poitiers (see above), the French Government had already staked out its position on VCR trade with Japan. It presumably
required no convincing by Philips and Grundig on the issue,
although it is interesting to speculate over the extent to which its
stance also reflected the preferences of Thomson which in the past
had been the ‘chief of the protectionists’ in the European
industry.”
With the Dutch Government having been shifted into the
protectionist camp by Philips, the greatest resistance to the
imposition of some form of import controls on Japanese VCRs
could have been expected to come from the West German
Government. Along with the Danish and (hitherto) the Dutch
Governments, the West German Government had generally been
the stoutest defender of free trade among the EEC Member States.
The Federal Economics Ministry’s antipathy towards import
controls may in fact have had some impact on the form of
protection ultimately agreed by the EEC Council of Ministers,
which was a ‘voluntary self-restraint agreement’ with japan.
However, even such self-restraint agreements had in the past been
vetoed by West Germany in the Council. The West German
Government’s abstention in the vote on the agreement in the
Council of Ministers signified if not a radical, then none the less a
significant, modification of its past trade policy.
Within the Bonn Economics Ministry, the section for the
electrical engineering industry-—characteristically—had the most
receptive attitude to the V2000 firms’ case. Elsewhere in the
Ministry, in the trade and European policy and policy principles
divisions and at the summit, the Ministry’
s traditional policy in
favour of free trade was given up much more reluctantly. The
Ministry did not oppose the voluntary restraint agreement after it
had been negotiated, but it may be questioned whether the
Ministry’s acquiescence in the agreement was motivated solely by its
feeling of impotence vis-£1-vis the united will of the other Member
States. Abstaining on the vote in the Council of Ministers enabled
the V2000 protectionist lobby to reap its benefits without the West
German Government being held responsible for its implementation.
The Govemment’s abstention may equally have been the result of
the pressure exerted on the Economics Ministry by the V2000
firms, particularly Philips and Grundig, both of which engaged in
bilateral talks with the Ministry, and from the consumer electronics
sub-association of the electrical engineering trade association of the
ZVEI (Zentralverband der Elektrotechnischen lndustrie), in which
a majority of the member firms had sided with Philips and Grundig.
The Ministry, by its own admission, did not listen as closely to the
firms which were simply marketing Japanese VCRs as to those
which actually manufactured VCRs in Europe: ‘we were interested
in increasing the local content (of VCRs) to preserve jobs.’
The success of the V2000 firms in obtaining any agreement at all
from the Japanese to restrain their exports of VCRs to the EEC
does not mean that they were happy with all aspects of the
agreement, least of all with its contents concerning VCR prices and
concrete quotas which were agreed with the Japanese. As the
market subsequently expanded less rapidly than the European
Commission had anticipated, the quota allocated to Japanese
imports (including the ‘kits’ assembled by European licensees of
Japanese firms) amounted to a larger share of the market than
expected and the European VCR manufacturers did not sell as
many VCRs as the agreement provided. Ironically, within a year of
the adoption of the agreement, both Philips and Grundig announced
that they were beginning to manufacture VCRs according to the
Japanese VHS technology and by the time the agreement had
expired (to be superceded by increased tariffs for VCRs) in 1985,
the two firms had stopped manufacturing V2000 VCRs altogether.
The Politics of Transnational European Mergers and Take-overs
The wave of merger and take-over activity in the European
consumer electronics industry which peaked around 1982 and
1983 had begun in West Gemany in the late 1970s, when Thomson
swallowed up several of the smaller West German firms- Normende,
Dual, and Saba ...and Philips, apparently reacting to the threat it
perceived Thomson as posing to its West German interests, bought
a 24.5 per cent shareholding in Grundig.3° The frenzied series of
successful and unsuccessful merger and take-over bids which
unfolded in 1982 and 1983 is inseparable from the growing crisis of
the European industry and the major European firms’ perceptions
as to how they could restructure in order to survive in the face of
Japanese competition.
The first candidate which emerged for take-over on the West
German market was Telefunken, for which AEG, itself in desperate
financial straits, had been seeking a buyer since the late 1970s.
Telefunken’s heavy indebtedness, which was largely a consequence
of losses it had incurred in its foreign operations, posed a
formidable obstacle to its disposal, however, and first Thomson,
which had bought AEG’s tube factory, and then Grundig, baulked
at taking it on as long as AEG had not paid off its debts. While talks
on Telefunken’s possible sale to Grundig were still going on in
1982, Grundig’s own financial position was quickly worsening as a
result primarily of its mounting losses in VCR manufacture.
Grundig c
onfessed publicly that if the firm carried on five more
years as it was doing, it would ‘go under like AEG’, which, in
summer 1982, had become insolvent. Grundig intensified his search
for stronger partners, which he had apparently begun by talking
with Siemens in 1981. In late 1982, at the same time as Grundig
and Philips were pressing for curbs on Japanese VCR imports,
Grundig floated the idea of creating, based around Grundig, a
European consumer electronics ‘superfirm’ involving Philips,
Thomson, Bosch, Siemens, SEL, and Telefunken. Most of the
prospective participants in such a venture were unenthusiastic
about Grundig’s plans, however, and the outcome of Grundig’s
search for a partner or partners to secure its survival was that
Thomson offered to buy a 75.5 per cent shareholding in the firm.
Political opinion in West Germany was overwhelmingly, if not
indeed uniformly, hostile to Thomson’s plan to take over Grundig.
The political difficulties which Thomson and Grundig faced in
securing special ministerial permission for the
ir deal were exacer-
bated by the probability of job losses given a rapidly deteriorating
labour market situation, and by the fact that, as late as 1982 and
early 1983, an election campaign was in progress. Moreover, the
Federal Economics Ministry was apparently concerned that, if
Thomson took over Grundig, the West German Government would
have been exposed to the danger of trade policy blackmail from the
French Government, which could then have demanded increased
protection for the European consumer electronics industry as the
price for Thomson not running down employment at Grundig (and
in other West German subsidiaries).
The decisive obstacle to Thomson's taking over Grundig,
however, lay not with the position of the Federal Economics
Ministry (or that of the Government or the FCO or the Deutsche
Bank), but rather in that of Grundig’s minority shareholder,
Philips. Against expectations, the FCO announced that it would
approve the take-over, but only provided that Philips gave up its
shareholding in Grundig and that Grundig also abandoned its plans
to assume control of Telefunken. As talks on Grundig’s plan to take
over Telefunken had already been suspended, the latter condition
posed no problem to Thomson’s taking over Grundig.
Once it had been put on the spot by the FCO's decision, Philips
was forced to leave its cover and declare that it would not withdraw
from Grundig. Apart from its general concern at being confronted
with an equally strong competitor on the European consumer
electronics market, Philips’s motives in thwarting Thomson's take-
over of Grundig were probably twofold. First, Thomson evidently
did not want to commit itself to continue manufacturing VCRs
according to the Philips—-Grundig V2000 technology, but wanted
rather to keep the Japanese (VHS) option open and, according to its
public declarations, to work with Grundig on the development of a
new generation of VCRs. Secondly, Philips was, ahead of Siemens,
Grundig’s biggest components supplier, with annual sales to
Grundig worth several hundred million Deutschmarks. lf Thomson
had taken over Grundig, this trade would have been lost.
A sequel to the failure of Thomson's bid for Grundig was that in
1984, with bank assistance, Philips assumed managerial control of
Grundig. Thus, at the end of this phase of the restructuring
programme of the European consumer electronics industry, two
main groups have emerged, one centred around Philips, the other
around Thomson, and Blaupunkt is the only significant firm in
West Germany left under West German control. But a common
European response (i.e. one involving Philips and Thomson) to the
Japanese challenge of the kind which Max Grundig had envisaged
in 1982 had not come about, and may be less likely given
Thomson’s acquisitions in Britain and the US which make it a much
more powerful competitor to Philips. But the acceleration in
Japanese and also Korean inward investment in Europe in 1986-7,
especially in VCR production where there are now a total of twenty
Far Eastern-owned plants, suggests that the process of restructuring
within Europe is far from complete.
The recent experience of the European consumer electronics
industry points to the critical role of the framework and instruments
of regulation in trying to account for the different responses of the
various national industries and governments to the challenges
posed by growing Japanese competitive strength and technological
leadership. At one extreme is self-regulation by individual firms,
where governments eschew any attempt to determine the responses
which particular firms make to changing market conditions, whilst
adopting policy regimes such as tax and tariff structures and
openness to inward investment which critically affect the conditions
under which self-regulation takes place." At the other extreme is
regulation by government intervention at the level of firm strategy,
where governments seek specific policy outcomes by offering
specific forms of inducement to selected firms and denying them to
others.”
HISTORY OF GRUNDIG IN GERMAN:
1930
gründet der Kaufmann und Radiobastler Max Grundig (1908-1989) den
Radio-Vertrieb Fürth, Grundig & Wurzer (RVF), ein
Radio-Fachgeschäft mit Werkstatt. Bald fabriziert der Betrieb auch
Transformatoren und Spulen, später zudem Prüfgeräte. 1934 zahlt Grundig
den Teilhaber und Freund Karl Wurzer aus. 1938 beträgt der Umsatz mehr
als 1 Mio. RM. Während des Krieges fabriziert Grundig im Dorf Vach mit
etwa 600 Personen, darunter vielen Ukrainerinnen, Kleintrafos,
elektrische Zünder und Steuergeräte für die V-Raketen. Das
Grundig-Vermögen schätzt man am Kriegsende auf 17,5 Mio. RM
Ab
18. Mai 1945 kann Grundig wieder in Fürth produzieren. Er lässt
Transformatoren wickeln, Reparaturen ausführen und stellt kurz darauf
das Röhrenprüfgerät «Tubatest» und das Fehler-Suchgerät «Novatest» her.
Ab 15.1.46 lässt Grundig den externen Ing. Hans Eckstein, den früheren
Konstrukteur bei Lumophon, einen Einkreiser-Baukasten mit späterem
Namen «Heinzelmann» entwickeln. Anfang 1946 beschäftigt Grundig ca. 100
Personen. Ab Oktober 1946 läuft die Produktion des «Heinzelmann» und
die Firma stellt bis Ende 1946 391 Baukästen her. Die vierseitige
Geschichte dazu findet sich in der Zeitschrift «rft» 1991, ab Seite 421.
Grundig hat auch 1947 grossen Erfolg, denn ein Baukasten ist ohne
Bezugsschein erhältlich. Das erste Modell (A) ist ein
Zwei-Röhren-Allstromempfänger mit Wehrmachtsröhren RV12P2000. Die
Produktion findet bald mit 120 Mitarbeitern auf 400 qm statt. Anfang
1947 folgt Modell W [634701]. Der Baukasten erreicht 1948 eine Stückzahl
von 39'256 [DRM].
Am 15.3.47
beginnt Grundig mit dem Bau eines modernen Fabrikgebäudes auf 8000 qm
Fläche. Mitte 1948 kann die Firma den Superhet «Weltklang» anbieten; er
findet ebenfalls guten Absatz. 400 Personen arbeiten auf 3000 qm
Fläche. Im Juli 1948 benennt Grundig seine Firma in Grundig-Radiowerke
GmbH um. Jetzt arbeiten 650 Personen im Betrieb. 1949 kommt als erstes
deutsches Nachkriegs-Koffergerät der «Grundig-Boy» auf den Markt. Die
Firma bringt eine Neukonstruktion des «Heinzelmann» auf den Markt.
Zudem entsteht der Vier-Kreis-Super «Weltklang 268GW». Im Mai 1949
erreicht der Betrieb in der Bizone (eigentlich Trizone!) 20 %
Marktanteil [664905]. Die Bizone ist der Zusammenschluss der amerikan.
und brit. Besatzungszone von 1947 bis 8.4.49, die sich ab dann durch den
Anschluss der frz. Besatzungszone zur Trizone erweitert.
Am
16. Mai 1951 übernimmt Grundig die Lumophon-Werke (ebenfalls in Fürth)
für den Betrag von 1,7 Mio. DM. Im gleichen Jahr entstehen erste
Grundig-Tonbandgeräte. 1952 beginnt die Produktion von Fernsehgeräten.
Das Unternehmen beschäftigt nun 6000 Personen und feiert am 12. Mai 1952
den millionsten Rundfunkempfänger. Die Baureihe von 1952/53 ist
erstmals technisch und formal einheitlich gestaltet, wobei Grundig die
prinzipielle Form bis 1956/57 beibehält. Ausser Typ 810 mit
Flankengleichrichter enthalten alle Geräte einen integrierten FM-Teil
mit Ratiodetektor. 1955 bezeichnet sich Grundig als den grössten
Tonbandgeräte-Hersteller der Welt. 1956 kauft er das
Telefunken-Rundfunkgerätewerk Dachau [639071]. 1959 besteht Grundig aus
sieben Werken, zwei Tochtergesellschaften plus einer Neugründung in den
USA. 1964 übernimmt Grundig die Tonfunk-Werke, Karlsruhe. 1969
beteiligt sich Grundig mehrheitlich an der Kaiser-Radio in Kenzingen.
Max Grundig ist seit 1970 gesundheitlich angeschlagen.
1978
gehören 31 Werke, 9 Niederlassungen mit 20 Filialen und drei
Werksvertretungen, 8 Vertriebs- und 200 Exportvertretungen zur Grundig
AG. 1979 beschäftigt das Unternehmen 38'000 Personen; der Umsatz liegt
bei 3 Mrd. DM. Ein Hauptstandort ist Nürnberg. Grundig muss sich jedoch
einer Umstrukturierung unterziehen und Philips erhält 1979 eine
Beteiligung von rund 25 %. 1980/81 muss Grundig einen Verlust von 187
Mio. DM hinnehmen. Zusätzlich scheitert das Gerät «VIDEO 2000»
finanziell.
Eine detaillierte Firmengeschichte enthält das 1983 erschienene Buch: «Sieben Tage im Leben des Max Grundig» von Egon Fein.
Allerdings lässt sich aus [481, Saba] auch wenig Schmeichelhaftes über das Machtstreben von Max Grundig erfahren.
1984
erhöht Philips die Beteiligung um 7 % und übernimmt die
unternehmerische Verantwortung. 1986/87 kann das Unternehmen mit noch
19'500 Mitarbeitern wieder schwarze Zahlen schreiben. 1987/88
beschäftigt Grundig noch 18'700 Personen bei einem Umsatz von
3,2
Mrd. DM, wovon 90 % auf die Unterhaltungselektronik entfallen. In
diesem Geschäftsjahr verlassen 2 Mio. Farbfernsehgeräte und 750'000
Videorecorder die Bänder. Max Grundig stirbt im Dezember 1989 [639071] -
letztlich hatte er nicht das vierblättrige, sondern das dreiblättrige
Kleeblatt als Firmenemblem gewählt.
Philips hat das
Unternehmen vollständig übernommen. Mitte 90er Jahre beschäftigt
Grundig noch 8000 Personen. Eine detaillierte Firmengeschichte findet
sich in «kleeblatt radio» ab 5/93 des Förderverein des Rundfunkmuseums
der Stadt Fürth eV.
1998 verkaufte Philips das
Unternehmen an ein Konsortium unter Führung von Anton Kathrein von den
Kathrein-Werken. Im Jahre 2001 wurde bei einem Umsatz von 1,2
Milliarden Euro ein Verlust von 150 Millionen Euro erwirtschaftet.
Daher verlängerten die Banken im Herbst 2002 die Kreditlinien nicht
mehr, was zur Insolvenz im April 2003 führte. In der Folgezeit wurden
gewinnbringende Sparten (wie z.B. Bürogeräte, Autoradios) aus dem
Konzern herausgelöst und einzeln verkauft. Verlustreiche Sparten wurden
stillgelegt und die Mitarbeiter entlassen. Heute erhältliche Neuware
von Grundig ist kaum noch "made in Germany".
