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How many times when watching somewhat at the Tv you said: "Please REPLAY that Scene...." You couldn't until you have had a machine called VideoRecorder........The TeleVideoRamaMuseum shows the Hi Tech behind Old Video Tape Recorders of all types VHS V2000 Beta VCR to show, one more time, what real technology engineering was instead of todays DRM gizmos Crap. Site under development, coming soon !
There are lots of vintage electrical and electronic items that have not survived well or even completely disappeared and forgotten.
Or are not being collected nowadays in proportion to their significance or prevalence in their heyday, this is bad and the main part of the death land. The heavy, ugly sarcophagus; models with few endearing qualities, devices that have some over-riding disadvantage to ownership such as heavy weight,toxicity or inflated value when dismantled, tend to be under-represented by all but the most comprehensive collections and museums. They get relegated to the bottom of the wants list, derided as 'more trouble than they are worth', or just forgotten entirely. As a result, I started to notice gaps in the current representation of the history of electronic and electrical technology to the interested member of the public.
Following this idea around a bit, convinced me that a collection of the peculiar alone could not hope to survive on its own merits, but a museum that gave equal display space to the popular and the unpopular, would bring things to the attention of the average person that he has previously passed by or been shielded from. It's a matter of culture. From this, the Tele Video Rama Web Museum concept developed and all my other things too. It's an open platform for all electrical Electronic TV technology to have its few, but NOT last, moments of fame in a working, hand-on environment. We'll never own Colossus or Faraday's first transformer, but I can show things that you can't see at the Science Museum, and let you play with things that the Smithsonian can't allow people to touch, because my remit is different.
There was a society once that was the polar opposite of our disposable, junk society. A whole nation was built on the idea of placing quality before quantity in all things. The goal was not “more and newer,” but “better and higher" .This attitude was reflected not only in the manufacturing of material goods, but also in the realms of art and architecture, as well as in the social fabric of everyday life. The goal was for each new cohort of children to stand on a higher level than the preceding cohort: they were to be healthier, stronger, more intelligent, and more vibrant in every way.
The society that prioritized human, social and material quality is a Winner. Truly, it is the high point of all Western civilization. Consequently, its defeat meant the defeat of civilization itself.
Today, the West is headed for the abyss. For the ultimate fate of our disposable society is for that society itself to be disposed of. And this will happen sooner, rather than later.
OLD, but ORIGINAL, Well made, Funny, Not remotely controlled............. and not Made in CHINA.
N.V. Philips, the Holland -based electronics giant, has introduced. a completely new home videocassette recording system for the European market and says it will have a U.S. (NTSC color standard) version in about a year. The Video 2000 system was designed for flexibility in adapting to new developments, such as metal tape, stereo sound and special control signals. The cassette, about the same size as a VHS type, contains half-inch tape and can record for up to eight hours on two quarter - inch helically scanned tracks. Like Philips' audio cassette, it is turned over after one track is recorded or played. Future recorder models obviously will have an auto -reverse fea- ture to eliminate the turn -over operation. Perhaps the most noteworthy development in the new system is the inclusion of a Dynamic Track Following circuit that uses auxiliary signals to assure that the head is properly positioned on the tape both for recording and playback for complete compatibility, and to provide clean, noiseless slow -, fast- and stop- motion. The cassette has special indexing tabs to adjust the recorder for either chrome or metal tape (the latter was not available.). The tape has two auxiliary signal tracks (not used in the first machines). Philips' first VCR designed for the new system has a micro -processor wireless remote -control system that not only governs the record and play functions, but tunes in broadcast channels, can locate any segment of the tape by dialing up a four -digit figure corresponding to a number on the digital tape counter, and is used to pre-select any five programs over a 16-day period for automatic recording. The system was co developed with Grundig, which is producing its own VCR models. it's incompatible with all other home VCR systems in use, including Philips' previous system. Magnavox, Philips subsidiary in the United States, currently sells VHS video recorders built by Matsushita of Japan. It's not yet clear whether Magnavox will offer a version of the Philips' system in this country. One possibility offered by the Video 2000 system is a compact portable VCR using one -quarter-inch tape -in effect, a single track instead of two parallel tracks. A Philips spokesman conceded that "in the system it is possible" to do this. Although such a shaved -down cassette wouldn't be compatible in size with the home recorder, conceivably an adapter could be made available to let the big machine scan the mini-cassettes.
For more than thirty years after the Second World War, consumer
electronics in West Germany, as elsewhere, was a growth industry.
Output growth in the industry was sustained by buoyant consumer
demand for successive generations of new or modified products,
such as radios (which had already begun to be manufactured, of
course, before the Second World War), black-and-white and then
colour television sets, hi-fi equipment.” Among the largest West
European states, West Germany had by far the strongest industry.
Even as recently as 1982, West Germany accounted for 60 per cent
of the consumer electronics production in the four biggest EEC
states. The West German industry developed a strong export
orientation--in the early 1980s as much as 60 per cent of West
German production was exported, and West Germany held a larger
share of the world marltet than any other national industry apart
from the]apanese.ltwas also technologicallyextremelyinnovative-
the first tape recorders, the PAL colour television technology, and
the technology which later permitted the development of the video
cassette recorder all originated in West Germany.
GOVERNMENTS, MARKETS, AND REGULATION
During the 1970s, this picture of a strong West German
consumer electronics industry began slowly to change and, by the end of the 19705, colour television manufacture no longer offered a guarantee for the continued prosperity or even survival of the German industry. The market for colour television sets was increasingly saturated——by 1978 56 per cent of all households in
West Germany had a colour television set and 93 per cent of all households possessed a television set of some kind.2° From 1978 onwards, the West German market for colour television sets began
to contract. Moreover, the PAL patents began to expire around
1980 and the West German firms then became exposed to more
intense competition on the (declining) domestic market.
The West German firms’ best chances for maintaining or
expanding output and profitability lay in their transition to the
manufacture of a new generation of consumer electronics products,
that of the video cassette recorder (VCR). Between 1978 and 1983,
the West German market for VCRs expanded more than tenfold, so
that, by the latter year, VCRs accounted for over a fifth of the
overall consumer electronics market.“ However, in this product
segment, Grundig was the only West German firm which, in
conjunction with Philips, managed to establish a foothold, while
the other firms opted to assemble and/or sell VCRs manufactured
according to one or the other of the two Japanese video
technologies. By 1981, the West German VCR market was more
tightly in the grip of Japanese firms than any other segment of the
market. More than any other, this development accounted for the
growing crisis of the West German consumer electronics industry in
the early 1980s. The West German market stagnated, production
declined as foreign firms conquered a growing share of the
domestic market and this trend was not offset by an expansion of
exports, production processes were rationalized to try to cut costs
as prices fell, employment contracted,” and more and more plants
were either shut down or—more frequently——taken over.
Decisions of the FCO may be contested in the Courts, and firms
whose merger or take-over plans have been rejected by the Cartel
Office may appeal for permission to proceed with their plans to the
Federal Economics Minister. He is empowered by law to grant such
permission when it is justified by an ‘overriding public interest’ or
‘macroeconomic benefits’, which may relate to competitiveness on
export markets, employment, and defence or energy policy.”
However, the state had no positive strategy for the consumer
electronics industry and industry, for its part, appeared to have no
demands on the state, other than that, through its macroeconomic
policies, it should provide a favourable business environment. This
situation changed only when, as from the late 1970s onwards, the
Japanese export offensive in consumer electronics plunged the West
German industry into an even deeper crisis.
The Politics of European Restructuring
The burgeoning crisis of not only the West German, but also the
other national consumer electronics industries in the EC in the
early 1980s prompted pleas from the firms (and also organized
labour) for protective intervention by the state——by the European
Community as well as by its respective national Member States.
The partial ‘Europeanization’ of consumer electronics politics
reflected the strategies chosen and pursued by the major European
firms to try to counter, or avoid, the Japanese challenge. These
strategies contained two major elements: measures of at least
temporary protection against Japanese imports to give the firms
breathing space to build up or modernize their production
capacities and improve their competitiveness uis-ci-uis the Japanese
and partly also to put pressure on the Japanese to establish
production facilities in Europe and produce under the same
conditions as the European firms and (b), through mergers, take-
overs, and co-operation agreements, to regroup forces with the aim
of achieving similar economies of scale to those enjoyed by the most
powerful Japanese firms. The first element of these strategies
implicated the European Community in so far as it is responsible
for the trade policies of its Member States. The second element did
not necessarily involve the European Community, but had a Euro-
pean dimension to the extent that most of the take-overs and mergers
envisaged in the restructuring of the industry involved firms from
two or more of the EEC Member States, including the French state-
owned Thomson (see above). As this ‘regrouping of the forces’ of
the European consumer electronics industry was to unfold at first
largely on the West German market, the firms could only
implement their strategies once they had obtained the all-clear of
the FCO or, failing that, of the Federal Economics Ministry.
The immediate background to the calls for protection against
imported Japanese VCRs by European VCR manufacturing firms
was formed by massive cuts in prices for Japanese VCRs, as a
consequence of which, in 1982, the market share held by the V2000
VCR manufactured by Philips and Grundig declined sharply.”
Losses incurred in VCR manufacture led to a dramatic worsening
of Grundig’s financial position. In November 1982 Philips and
Grundig announced that they were considering taking a dumping
case against the Japanese to the European Commission. The case,
which was later withdrawn, can be seen as the first move in a
political campaign designed to secure controls or restraints on
Japanese VCR exports to the EEC states. This campaign was
pursued at the national and European levels, both through the
national and European trade associations for consumer electronics
firms and particularly through direct intervention by the firms at
the national governments and the European Commission. However,
the European firms, many of whom had licensing agreements with
the Japanese, were far from being united behind it.
Philips, seconded by its VCR partner, Grundig, was the ‘real
protagonist’ of protectionist measures against Japanese VCRs. In
pressing their case on EEC member states and the European
Commission, they emphasized the unfair trading practices of the
Japanese in building up production capacities which could meet the
entire world demand for VCRs (‘laser-beaming’), and the threats
which the Japanese export offensive posed to jobs in Western
Europe and to the maintenance of the firms’ R. 8: D. capacity and
technological know-how. Above all, however, was the threat which
the crisis in VCR trade and the consumer electronics industry
generally posed to the survival of a European microelectronic
components industry, over half of whose output, according to
Grundig, was absorbed in consumer electronics products.”
These arguments found by all accounts a very receptive audience at the European Commission, where, by common consent of German participants in the policy-formation process, Philips wields great political influence. By all accounts, Philips‘s pressure was also responsible for the conversion to the protectionist camp of the Dutch Government, which hitherto had been a bastion of free trade philosophy within the EEC. By imposing unilateral import controls through the channelling of imported VCRs through the customs depot at Poitiers (see above), the French Government had already staked out its position on VCR trade with Japan. It presumably
required no convincing by Philips and Grundig on the issue,
although it is interesting to speculate over the extent to which its
stance also reflected the preferences of Thomson which in the past
had been the ‘chief of the protectionists’ in the European
industry.”
Within the Bonn Economics Ministry, the section for the
electrical engineering industry-—characteristically—had the most
receptive attitude to the V2000 firms’ case. Elsewhere in the
Ministry, in the trade and European policy and policy principles
divisions and at the summit, the Ministry’s traditional policy in
favour of free trade was given up much more reluctantly. The
Ministry did not oppose the voluntary restraint agreement after it
had been negotiated, but it may be questioned whether the
Ministry’s acquiescence in the agreement was motivated solely by its
feeling of impotence vis-£1-vis the united will of the other Member
States. Abstaining on the vote in the Council of Ministers enabled
the V2000 protectionist lobby to reap its benefits without the West
German Government being held responsible for its implementation.
The Govemment’s abstention may equally have been the result of
the pressure exerted on the Economics Ministry by the V2000
firms, particularly Philips and Grundig, both of which engaged in
bilateral talks with the Ministry, and from the consumer electronics
sub-association of the electrical engineering trade association of the
ZVEI (Zentralverband der Elektrotechnischen lndustrie), in which
a majority of the member firms had sided with Philips and Grundig.
The Ministry, by its own admission, did not listen as closely to the
firms which were simply marketing Japanese VCRs as to those
which actually manufactured VCRs in Europe: ‘we were interested
in increasing the local content (of VCRs) to preserve jobs.’
The success of the V2000 firms in obtaining any agreement at all
from the Japanese to restrain their exports of VCRs to the EEC
does not mean that they were happy with all aspects of the
agreement, least of all with its contents concerning VCR prices and
concrete quotas which were agreed with the Japanese. As the
market subsequently expanded less rapidly than the European
Commission had anticipated, the quota allocated to Japanese
imports (including the ‘kits’ assembled by European licensees of
Japanese firms) amounted to a larger share of the market than
expected and the European VCR manufacturers did not sell as
many VCRs as the agreement provided. Ironically, within a year of
the adoption of the agreement, both Philips and Grundig announced
that they were beginning to manufacture VCRs according to the
Japanese VHS technology and by the time the agreement had
expired (to be superceded by increased tariffs for VCRs) in 1985,
the two firms had stopped manufacturing V2000 VCRs altogether.
The Politics of Transnational European Mergers and Take-overs
The wave of merger and take-over activity in the European
consumer electronics industry which peaked around 1982 and
1983 had begun in West Gemany in the late 1970s, when Thomson
swallowed up several of the smaller West German firms- Normende,
Dual, and Saba ...and Philips, apparently reacting to the threat it
perceived Thomson as posing to its West German interests, bought
a 24.5 per cent shareholding in Grundig.3° The frenzied series of
successful and unsuccessful merger and take-over bids which
unfolded in 1982 and 1983 is inseparable from the growing crisis of
the European industry and the major European firms’ perceptions
as to how they could restructure in order to survive in the face of
Japanese competition.
Grundig confessed publicly that if the firm carried on five more
years as it was doing, it would ‘go under like AEG’, which, in
summer 1982, had become insolvent. Grundig intensified his search
for stronger partners, which he had apparently begun by talking
with Siemens in 1981. In late 1982, at the same time as Grundig
and Philips were pressing for curbs on Japanese VCR imports,
Grundig floated the idea of creating, based around Grundig, a
European consumer electronics ‘superfirm’ involving Philips,
Thomson, Bosch, Siemens, SEL, and Telefunken. Most of the
prospective participants in such a venture were unenthusiastic
about Grundig’s plans, however, and the outcome of Grundig’s
search for a partner or partners to secure its survival was that
Thomson offered to buy a 75.5 per cent shareholding in the firm.
Political opinion in West Germany was overwhelmingly, if not
indeed uniformly, hostile to Thomson’s plan to take over Grundig.
The political difficulties which Thomson and Grundig faced in
securing special ministerial permission for their deal were exacer-
bated by the probability of job losses given a rapidly deteriorating
labour market situation, and by the fact that, as late as 1982 and
early 1983, an election campaign was in progress. Moreover, the
Federal Economics Ministry was apparently concerned that, if
Thomson took over Grundig, the West German Government would
have been exposed to the danger of trade policy blackmail from the
French Government, which could then have demanded increased
protection for the European consumer electronics industry as the
price for Thomson not running down employment at Grundig (and
in other West German subsidiaries).
The decisive obstacle to Thomson's taking over Grundig,
however, lay not with the position of the Federal Economics
Ministry (or that of the Government or the FCO or the Deutsche
Bank), but rather in that of Grundig’s minority shareholder,
Philips. Against expectations, the FCO announced that it would
approve the take-over, but only provided that Philips gave up its
shareholding in Grundig and that Grundig also abandoned its plans
to assume control of Telefunken. As talks on Grundig’s plan to take
over Telefunken had already been suspended, the latter condition
posed no problem to Thomson’s taking over Grundig.
Once it had been put on the spot by the FCO's decision, Philips
was forced to leave its cover and declare that it would not withdraw
from Grundig. Apart from its general concern at being confronted
with an equally strong competitor on the European consumer
electronics market, Philips’s motives in thwarting Thomson's take-
over of Grundig were probably twofold. First, Thomson evidently
did not want to commit itself to continue manufacturing VCRs
according to the Philips—-Grundig V2000 technology, but wanted
rather to keep the Japanese (VHS) option open and, according to its
public declarations, to work with Grundig on the development of a
new generation of VCRs. Secondly, Philips was, ahead of Siemens,
Grundig’s biggest components supplier, with annual sales to
Grundig worth several hundred million Deutschmarks. lf Thomson
had taken over Grundig, this trade would have been lost.
The recent experience of the European consumer electronics
industry points to the critical role of the framework and instruments
of regulation in trying to account for the different responses of the
various national industries and governments to the challenges
posed by growing Japanese competitive strength and technological
leadership. At one extreme is self-regulation by individual firms,
where governments eschew any attempt to determine the responses
which particular firms make to changing market conditions, whilst
adopting policy regimes such as tax and tariff structures and
openness to inward investment which critically affect the conditions
under which self-regulation takes place." At the other extreme is
regulation by government intervention at the level of firm strategy,
where governments seek specific policy outcomes by offering
specific forms of inducement to selected firms and denying them to
others.”